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The change employed involved malicious code that was injected into the library nssock2.dll, which was used by all of the company’s products. The ShadowPad case, which involved the compromise of NetSarang Computer, Inc., resulting in the backdooring of all of the company’s products (July 2017).
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The CCleaner case, which involved the compromise of Piriform, resulting in the backdooring of the CCleaner software (August 2017). An attack on the gaming industry (Winnti.A), which involved the compromise of three gaming companies and the backdooring of their respective main executables (publicized in March 2019). #Microsoft visual c runtime library buffer overrun update#
The change employed involved a malicious update component.
Operation ShadowHammer, which involved the compromise of a computer vendor’s update server to target an unknown set of users based on their network adapters’ media access control (MAC) addresses (June 2018). NET) and update server (March 2015).Īn example of an attack that solely made use of Method 3 is the Monju incident, which involved the compromise of the update server for the media player GOM Player by GOMLab and resulted in the distribution of a variant of Gh0st RAT toward specific targets (December 2013).įor Method 4, we have the Havex incidents, which involved the compromise of multiple industrial control system (ICS) websites and software installers (different dates in 20).Įxamples of attacks that used a combination of Methods 2 and 3 are: #Microsoft visual c runtime library buffer overrun windows#
The KingSlayer attack on EventID, which resulted in the compromise of the Windows Event Log Analyzer software’s source code (service executable in. The change employed involved backdooring of the. The Nyetya/MeDoc attack on M.E.Doc, an accounting software by Intellect Service, which delivered the destructive ransomware Nyetya/NotPetya by manipulating its update system (April 2017). The change employed involved a malicious update component and a trojanized copy of the file mediaget. The trojanization of MediaGet, a BitTorrent client, via a poisoned update (mid-February 2018). However, Method 2 is far more insidious since any tampering in the code is not visible to the developer or any source code parser the malicious code is introduced at the time of compilation/linking.Įxamples of attacks that used a combination of Methods 1 and 3 are: Methods 1 and 2 stand out from the other methods because of the nature of their operation, which is the intrusive and more subtle tampering of code - they are a category in their own right. Furthermore, the ShadowPad incident is taken as a test case, documenting how such poisoning happens.
The focus will be on Method 2, whereby a list of all poisoned C/C++ runtime functions will be provided, each mapped to its unique malware family. This blog post will explore and attempt to map multiple known supply chain attack incidents that have happened in the last decade through the four methods listed above. Such trojanized software is either hosted on the official yet compromised website of a software company or spread via BitTorrent or other similar hosting zones.
The repackaging of legitimate software with a malicious implant. #Microsoft visual c runtime library buffer overrun download#
This malicious implant can come from the same compromised download server or from another completely separate server that is under the attacker’s control.
Other less intrusive methods, which include the compromise of the update server such that instead of deploying a benign updated version, it serves a malicious implant. The injection of malicious code inside C/C++ compiler runtime (CRT) libraries, e.g., poisoning of specific C runtime functions. The injection of malicious code at the source code level of the compromised software, for native or interpreted/just-in-time compilation-based languages such as C/++, Java, and. Depending on the attacker’s technical capabilities and stealth motivation, the methods used in the malicious modification of the compromised software vary in sophistication and astuteness.įour major methods have been observed in the wild: In either case, the intention is to always get into the network or a host of a targeted entity in a highly inconspicuous fashion - which is known as a supply chain attack. Such attacks involve the original software’s being compromised via malicious tampering of its source code, its update server, or in some cases, both. For the past few years, the security industry’s very backbone - its key software and server components - has been the subject of numerous attacks through cybercriminals’ various works of compromise and modifications.